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ABSTRACT 
 
Ryan Peeks 
―A SIMPLE TRUST IN BIGNESS:‖ STRATEGIC CULTURE AND THE U.S. 
NAVY‘S REACTION TO THE DREADNOUGHT REVOLUTION, 1903-1910 
(Under the direction of Wayne Lee) 
 
This thesis explores the impact of strategic culture on the United States Navy‘s reaction 
to the dreadnought and battlecruiser ship types introduced by the British Navy under 
Admiral Fisher. This essay concludes that the strategic culture of the U.S. Navy, shaped 
in large part by Alfred Thayer Mahan, was unable to adapt to the new environment 
suggested by Fisher‘s ships. While the U.S. Navy adopted dreadnoughts, its leaders and 
thinkers were unable to grasp the battlecruiser concept, and decided against building 
them.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 1900 was a good time to be an officer in the United States Navy. Yes, the pay was 
low, and promotion glacial, but the Navy itself was in great shape. The steady naval 
rearmament since 1890 had borne fruit, and in the recently concluded ―splendid little 
war‖ with Spain, the Navy had single-handedly captured the Philippines and Guam, and 
had played a major role in Puerto Rico and Cuba. An admiral, George Dewey, was the 
foremost hero of the late war, and now led the newly-formed General Board, which 
promised to rationalize and professionalize the development of naval policy. Although 
the Navy  had only four battleships in commission, the oldest had been commissioned 
five years earlier, and another ten were building or authorized, with the prospect of more 
on the horizon. With a new maritime empire, no wars imminent, and the political will to 
keep building up the fleet, the Navy appeared poised for a comfortable rise to first-rate 
status.  
 In a sense, this vision was not incorrect. In the first decade of the twentieth 
century, there were no wars with foreign powers, and by the end of the decade, the Navy 
was among the world‘s most powerful. In hindsight, however, the turn of the twentieth 
century was a time of upheaval, a time when ―the leaders of major navies were 
confronted by technical, personnel, economic, administrative and financial problems that 
 `  
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were arguably of greater scale, difficulty, and complexity than that facing the executives 
of any other department of state or private corporation.‖1 While the ensuing decade did 
not overly strain the Navy‘s ability to build ships, its intellectual capacity to handle these 
changes in naval affairs was put to the test. Unlike the war with Spain, this struggle 
would not be entirely successful.  
 The major agent of change was a British admiral, John ―Jacky‖ Fisher, who was 
the First Sea Lord from late 1904. Under his lead, the Royal Navy built HMS 
Dreadnought (1906) and HMS Invincible (1908), two warships that radically changed the 
parameters of naval affairs. The two ships encapsulated the major technological leaps of 
the day: turbine engines offering more horsepower than older reciprocating engines, new 
guns capable of reaching unprecedented ranges, and the new equipment to ensure that 
those guns hit their targets. But to argue that Dreadnought and Invincible merely resulted 
from applying new technologies to naval design is to ignore the conceptual shift 
envisioned by Fisher. With the two ships, Fisher yoked new technologies to an equally 
radical reimagining of naval warfare. 
Even before being named First Sea Lord, Fisher had been looking for new ways 
to revitalize the Royal Navy‘s traditional attack-minded mission. In a memorandum, 
―Naval Necessities, Volume I‖ submitted in 1904 to the outgoing First Sea Lord and the 
Admiralty Board, Fisher argued that in accordance with the Royal Navy‘s traditional 
focus on attack, the most important factor in new ship design was ―speed. . . . Some 
people don‘t want it for battleships, but they are wrong, because both strategy and tactics 
                                                             
1Jon Testuro Sumida and David Alan Rosenberg, ―Machines, Men, Manufacturing, Management and 
Money: The Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twentieth Century 
Naval History,‖ in Doing Naval History: Essays Towards Improvement, ed. John B. Hattendorf (Newport, 
RI: Naval War College Press, 1995), 35.  
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demand speed.‖2 Combined with increased firepower, Fisher believed that speed held the 
key to victory, as combat took place ―at a range which will be chosen by the FASTER 
fleet.‖3 When Fisher became First Sea Lord, this focus on speed quickly found its way 
into the Royal Navy‘s polices. Upon taking office, he created a reform-friendly 
Committee on Designs, which rubber-stamped Fisher‘s new ships, incorporating his dual 
goals of firepower and speed into the Royal Navy‘s newest designs.  
The first of Fisher‘s new ships was a new battleship, which he named HMS 
Untakeable in his 1904 ―Naval Necessities‖ memorandum, a design that would become 
the basis of the Dreadnought. As set by the Committee on Designs, Dreadnought could 
reach a top speed of 21 knots, utilizing turbine engines, about three knots faster than 
contemporary battleships. At the same time, Dreadnought was the first completed 
battleship with what was called an ―all-big-gun‖ armament. Instead of the multiplicity of 
calibers seen in other battleships, Dreadnought mounted ten 12‖ guns. Fisher wanted his 
ships to fire accurately at long range—as far as seven miles—in order to, he assumed, 
capitalize on the better training of British crews. Not only would the 12‖ guns give the 
largest weight of fire at long ranges, but the uniform battery increased the efficiency of 
fire control. At the time, adjustment was based on spotting shell splashes, and the 
Dreadnought’s battery simplified matters greatly by eliminating confusion between, for 
example, 10‖ and 12‖ splashes.  
The second new type was an upgraded armored cruiser, eventually dubbed the 
―battlecruiser.‖ Originally, Fisher intended for them to be armed with a uniform battery 
                                                             
2John Fisher, ―Naval Necessities, Volume I,‖ May 14, 1904, in The Fisher Papers, Volume I, ed. P.K. 
Kemp (London: The Navy Records Society, 1960), 28. Emphasis in original.  
3Fisher, ―Naval Necessities, Volume I,‖ October 19, 1904, 43. 
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4 
of 9.2‖ guns, the largest carried by cruisers at the time, with a top speed of 25 knots.4 
However, in the months between the memorandum and the first meeting of the 
Committee on Designs, that had been changed to 12‖ to match the battleship. Whereas 
the Dreadnought was designed for the battle line, the new cruiser design was built to 
―force [its] way up to within sight of a fleet and observe,‖ and to ―overtake and annihilate 
everything that floats except the [Dreadnought],‖ up to and including an enemy 
battleship fleet.
5
 These ships of unprecedented speed and power were the key to Fisher‘s 
conception of warfare, and so it is no surprise that while he only commissioned one 
Dreadnought, he built three Invincible-class battlecruisers.  
Fisher‘s new ships were the catalysts for a wholesale reappraisal of naval affairs. 
As James Goldrick has noted about the period, ―rapid developments in technology 
changed the fundamental measures by which force structures and thus balance of power 
were judged from types to capabilities.‖6 In other words, the designation of a ship—
battleship, armored cruiser and so on—mattered less than what that ship could do. 
Invincible, officially designated an armored cruiser, was far more capable than any pre-
dreadnought battleship because her speed and firepower were far more important than 
any classification. Indeed, this new paradigm was ―inherently dynamic, not static:‖ for 
battleships and battlecruisers, date of construction became almost as important as 
classification.
7
  
                                                             
4Fisher, ―Naval Necessities, Volume I,‖ 86.  
5Committee on Designs, ―Proceedings,” January 3, 1905, in The Fisher Papers, vol I, 220-221. 
6James Goldrick, ―The Problems of Modern Naval History,‖ in Doing Naval History, 18.  
7Goldrick, ―Problems of Modern Naval History,‖ 18.   
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5 
But Fisher was not the only one coming up with ways to utilize new technologies 
and practices in ship design. As early as 1903, the United States Navy possessed a 
preliminary design for a battleship much like the Dreadnought. While British shipyards 
were recognized as the world‘s finest, the United States easily had the ability to build 
such a ship. Instead, the first American all-big-gun ship was not laid down until late 
1906, and another year elapsed before the Navy laid down a true dreadnought. By way of 
comparison, the Japanese Navy had begun building Satsuma, an all-big-gun ship (though 
with a mixed heavy battery) even before the Dreadnought, and Germany began 
construction of their first dreadnought, Nassau, in mid-1907. In terms of battlecruisers, 
the difference is even starker: the U.S. Navy laid down none until 1916.  
Clearly, then, the U.S. Navy failed to wholly grasp the changes wrought by 
Fisher. What explains this hesitation? It was not a question of money or technological 
prowess. Answering the question requires an inquiry into American naval thought rather 
than looking strictly at technological developments and ship design. Simply put, the Navy 
was operating under a set of assumptions that were ill-suited to the changing conditions 
of naval warfare. Its strategic culture was only able to accept dreadnoughts after a 
contentious intellectual struggle and could not adapt enough to accept battlecruisers as 
early as the other three major naval powers.  
Dreadnoughts were adopted over traditionalist objections, because dreadnoughts 
only challenged understandings of naval technology, not fundamental assumptions about 
the nature of war and battle. To adopt battlecruisers, the Navy would have had to move 
away from the key assumptions of Alfred Thayer Mahan and other traditional thinkers 
with great influence in the Navy. In the first decade of the twentieth century, this proved 
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a step too far for the Navy to take. While the parameters changed to allow for 
dreadnoughts, the Navy‘s strategic culture remained essentially Mahanian.  
Strategic culture is still a term subject to varying definitions, and a fuller 
explanation is in order. Originally used to describe culture-based analyses of Cold War 
nuclear policy, through the 1980s and 90s, it began to be used as an analytical tool 
outside of its original context. As defined by Alistair Iain Johnston, strategic culture is 
―an integrated ‗system of symbols which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting 
strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in 
interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of 
factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic.‖8 In terms of effect, 
strategic culture suggests that ―elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make 
different choices when placed in similar situations.‖9  
Strategic culture was developed and first used by political scientists like Johnston, 
but historians have begun to use it in recent years. Isabel Hull‘s Absolute Destruction 
(Cornell, 2005), uses this method (though Hull refers to it as ―military culture‖) to 
explain how the Germany military ―developed a constellation of mutually reinforcing 
characteristics that enhanced tactical efficacy,‖ which ―propelled the army to ever 
greater, and in the end, dysfunctional extremes of violence between 1870 and the First 
World War.‖10 By the end of the book, she has laid out the impact of that military culture 
on German society as a whole. In other words, Hull used historical analysis to fulfill the 
                                                             
8Alistair Iain Johnston, ―Thinking About Strategic Culture,‖ International Security, 19.4 (Spring 1995): 46.  
9Johnston, ―Thinking About Strategic Culture,‖ 35.  
10Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2005), 2.  
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goals of the original practitioners of strategic culture: exploring its impact on national 
policy and state-level conceptions of violence.  
However, some historians have taken the idea of strategic culture and shrunk it to 
the level of specific military institutions, the sense in which the term is used in this essay. 
In her Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, Tami Davis Biddle provides a definition of 
―organizational thought,‖ which neatly adapts the strategic culture idea to the institutional 
level: ―No institution speaks with a single, wholly unified voice, but, among any group of 
individuals, particular preferences and views come to be privileged, and these form the 
basis of what may be called organizational thought.‖11 At its core, any service‘s strategic 
culture necessarily rests on a series of assumptions on everything from the nature of 
warfare, down to the potential efficacy of weapons or weapon systems in combat. While 
assumptions, like Mahan‘s, derived from historical study are frequently privileged over 
those derived from theoretical thought, both remain untested—and untestable—in the 
absence of warfare. 
Biddle‘s book and Hull‘s are both organized around the creation and development 
of strategic culture, but the focus in this essay will be slightly different. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, the U.S. Navy had a mature strategic culture based primarily on 
Mahanian thought and so this essay will trace its effects on the Navy‘s response to the 
changes in naval technology and thought prompted by Fisher that quickly spread to the 
world‘s major navies. While it is easy for military historians to overstate the impact of 
new technology on determining the outcome of wars, by the early twentieth century, 
managing technological development and fitting doctrine to new technologies was one of, 
                                                             
11Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas 
about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2002), 6.  
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if not the, key roles of militaries in peacetime. As this essay will argue, the U.S. Navy‘s 
strategic culture at the turn of the century retarded that crucial process. While no war 
came during the years under consideration, contentious debates over dreadnoughts and 
the refusal to build battlecruisers left the U.S. Navy behind the rival navies of Britain, 
Germany and Japan. Naturally, then, the most promising avenue for investigation is not 
the history of the technologies themselves, but the history of the ideas that determined the 
response to those technologies.   
 Although the Navy‘s history after the Spanish-American War is reasonably well 
covered in the historical literature, the changes in naval technology generated by Fisher 
have rarely been portrayed as a catalyst for debate. Instead, the dominant narrative of the 
period centers on the growth of the Navy and its newfound assertiveness. Dudley Knox‘s 
A History of the American Navy (1936), which set the stage for much future 
historiography, has nothing to say on the strategic debates of the early 1900s or the shift 
to dreadnoughts, but their absence speaks volumes. Knox, an Annapolis graduate, was in 
the Navy during the events covered in this essay and, evidently felt them undeserving of 
attention, instead focusing on the ―Great White Fleet‖ and its around-the-world journey 
in 1907-9.
12
 Around the same time, Harold and Margaret Sprout‘s equally influential The 
Rise of American Naval Power  (1939) covered the period in more detail, but they merely 
claimed that ―American naval authorities had anticipated [Fisher‘s] development[s],‖ and 
moved on to discuss Roosevelt‘s fights with Congress over naval funding.13 While this is 
                                                             
12Dudley W. Knox, A History of the United States Navy (New York: G.P. Putnam‘s Sons, 1948), 377-8.   
13Harold and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918, 3rd edition (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1944), 263.  
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certainly an important facet of the Navy‘s development, the Sprouts‘ coverage ignores 
the intellectual struggle to bring these ideas to fruition.  
 While American naval historiography has certainly moved on from the prewar 
work of Dudley and the Sprouts, their blind spots remain in much of the subsequent 
literature. Brayton Harris‘s The Age of the Battleship (1965) follows the earlier works in 
ignoring the Navy‘s internal debate and treating adoption of dreadnought battleships as a 
given, devoting only a page to the shift. After claiming that ―[t]he Dreadnought was not 
so much a startling departure from the norm as it was a logical step forward,‖ Harris 
moves immediately to the South Carolina and Delaware-class battleships built by the 
United States as a response, with no sense of the internal debate.
14
 
 Even more recent historiography of this period has tended to focus on the politics 
of the era and the Navy‘s attempts to match its strategy to those inputs. Richard Turk‘s 
―Defending the New Empire‖ (1978) focuses on the impact of the Philippines on strategy, 
while Kenneth Hagan‘s essay ―The Apotheosis of Mahan‖ (1995), is organized around 
great power politics.
15
 While Hagan‘s essay can be read as a discussion of the Navy‘s 
strategic culture, he restricts his argument to strategy, leaving aside its effect on other 
facets of naval policy. Robert O‘Connell‘s controversial Sacred Vessels (1991) has a 
great deal to say about the Navy‘s strategic culture and the fleet‘s makeup, but he takes 
aim at the concept of battleship fleets and has little to say about the transition to 
                                                             
14Brayton Harris, The Age of the Battleship, 1890-1922 (New York: Franklin Watts, 1965), 113-4. 
15Richard W. Turk, ―Defending the New Empire, 1900-1914,‖ in In Peace and War: Interpretations of 
American Naval History, 1775-1978, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport CT: Greenwood, 1978); Kenneth J. 
Hagan, ―The Apotheosis of Mahan: American Naval Strategy, 1889-1922,‖ in Navies and Global Defense: 
Theories and Strategy, ed. Keith Neilson and Elizabeth Jane Errington‖ (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995).  
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dreadnoughts and nothing at all to say on battlecruisers.
16
 Most recent work has ignored 
this period entirely, and focused instead on the interwar period.
17
 
Only biographies of individual officers have effectively covered the intellectual 
ferment of the early 20
th
 century.
18
 However, these are all rather dated and, more 
importantly, focus on specific careers rather than the Navy as a whole. Understandably, 
the culture of the Navy at large takes a backseat. Thus, this essay, with its focus on 
strategic culture and the makeup of the fleet occupies a relatively empty niche in the 
literature.  
The main forum for intellectual debate in the Navy was Proceedings of the United 
States Naval Institute, a journal published by the semi-official United States Naval 
Institute, an organization composed mostly of active and retired naval officers. While 
Proceedings was full of articles on naval history, engineering, and high-level 
mathematics, it was also the forum for naval officers to discuss matters of naval policy 
and strategy, from the projected course of future wars to new trends in construction. It 
was here that the major internal debates of the period took place. Other key sources 
included The Navy (another journal), private letters, and the reports of the Navy‘s 
General Board, a panel of senior officers set up after the Spanish-American War to advise 
                                                             
16Robet O‘Connell, Sacred Vessels: The Cult of the Battleship and the Rise of the U.S. Navy (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1991).  
17See, for example, Craig Felker‘s Testing American Sea Power (College Station: Texas A&M University 
Press, 2007), Thomas and Trent Hone‘s Battle Line  (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), or William 
Still‘s Crisis at Sea (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2006). 
18The edited biography collection Admirals of the New Steel Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1990) has a great deal to say about naval culture when taken as a whole, while Elting Morison‘s Admiral 
Sims and the Modern American Navy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1942), Ronald Spector‘s biography of 
Dewey, Admiral of the New Empire (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,1974) and Paolo 
Coletta‘s Admiral Bradley A. Fiske and the American Navy (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 
1979) explore their subject‘s contributions to the Navy.  
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the Secretary on general policy. Examined side-by-side, these sources allow us to trace 
the development of American naval thought throughout the period.  
With the pace of technological reform rendering earlier examples increasingly 
irrelevant at a tactical and operational level and in the absence of modern empirical 
examples, ―operational art transferred itself from a basis of practical experience to a 
largely theoretical and thus unprovable level.‖19 As a result, Goldrick argues that ―the 
development of doctrine, the planning to operate and fight at sea, had to proceed almost 
wholly on the basis of theories which, however well-conceived, were resting on 
intrinsically uncertain foundations.‖20 Officers at the time clearly recognized this 
weakness. In Proceedings, there was a rush to claim the lessons of the Russo-Japanese 
War and the First World War for one set of theories or another, but these arguments were 
more concerned with fitting evidence to extant theories rather than using experiences to 
modify or change theory.  
Central to the process were the highly influential ideas of Alfred Thayer Mahan. 
Any discussion of American naval theory in the early twentieth century is necessarily a 
discussion of Mahan. Although his last article in Proceedings was published in 1907, 
Mahan continued to loom large over the Navy‘s debates. Abroad he was simply the 
world‘s most important naval theorist, whose major work, The Influence of Sea Power 
Upon History (1890) was, even at the time, credited (or blamed) for the multilateral naval 
arms race consuming steel and money across the globe. By 1904, his position in the eyes 
of the public both within and outside of the United States was unimpeachable: he had 
                                                             
19Goldrick, ―The Problems of Modern Naval History,‖ 13.  
20Goldrick, ―The Problems of Modern Naval History,‖ 14.  
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―transformed naval history‖ by adding ―serious analyses of naval grand strategy and the 
art and science of naval command.‖21  
Mahan‘s influence was even more keenly felt within the United States Navy. 
Although he retired as a captain, his fingerprints were all over most the important naval 
decisions undertaken in the 1890s and early 1900s. Not only had the Influence of Sea 
Power played a major role in the United States‘ naval revival, but he had allegedly 
ghostwritten the United States‘ first major naval bill in 1890.22 During that decade, he 
had also advocated for the annexation of Hawaii, had advised on the conduct of the 
Spanish-American War, and was a prominent backer of the push for a Central American 
canal. Mahan was one of the key figures at the Naval War College, which at the time 
educated promising mid-career officers and served as a semi-official war planning staff 
for the Navy. Perhaps most importantly, Mahan was a regular correspondent with 
President Theodore Roosevelt as well as various senators and congressmen, through 
whom he exerted considerable influence over both the formulation of naval policy and its 
execution. It is no surprise, then, that the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
have been referred to as ―The Age of Mahan.‖23 
Even if the claim has not always been made so explicitly, Mahan dominates the 
historiography of the Navy‘s intellectual development up to the present. As one historian 
puts it, ―most naval officers unconditionally accepted Mahan‘s sea-control doctrine well 
                                                             
21Jon Testuro Sumida, Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching Command: The Classic Works of Alfred 
Thayer Mahan Reconsidered (Washington, D.C. and Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press and 
the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 99. 
22Benjamin Franklin Cooling, Gray Steel and Blue Water Navy: The Formative Years of America’s Military 
Industrial Complex, 1881-1917 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1979), 87-8. 
23Donald W. Mitchell, History of the Modern American Navy from 1883 through Pearl Harbor (New York: 
Knopf, 1946), 121.  
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after the architect left active service.‖24 The Sprouts called Mahan‘s work ―the basic 
doctrine of American naval policy,‖ and went on to claim that Theodore Roosevelt‘s 
naval worldview was entirely shaped by Mahan‘s theories.25 While Mahan‘s reputation 
has taken something of a beating in recent years, it is still difficult to find works on the 
American navy that do not treat the entire period under consideration as one in which 
Mahan was the dominant, if not the only, voice in naval affairs. More to the point, 
Mahan‘s views have shaped those of most American naval historians, stretching back to 
Dudley Knox in the 1920s and 30s.
26
 
But Mahan was not just a theorist and historian. Throughout his career, he wrote 
on all aspects of naval affairs, and these views must also be understood when taking the 
measure of his influence. Much like the ―cult of the attack‖ in France, a contemporary 
ideology of land warfare, Mahan‘s writings were the basis of an entire self-contained 
worldview complete with its own internal logic. On a macro scale, it ―placed armaments 
and considerations of the balance of military force at the very center of interstate 
relations,‖ and ―entailed a commitment to a competitive arms buildup and to the drive for 
margins of superiority within the overall balance of force.‖27  
                                                             
24Craig C. Felker, Testing American Sea Power: U.S. Navy Strategic Exercises, 1923-1940 (College 
Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 24.  
25Sprout and Sprout, Rise of American Naval Power, 205, 250.  
26Kenneth J. Hagan, ―The Apotheosis of Mahan: American Naval Strategy, 1889-1922, in Navies and 
Global Defense: Theories and Strategy, eds. Keith Neilson and Elizabeth Jane Errington (Wesport, CT: 
Praegar, 1995), 115.  
27Dirk Bönker, ―Militarizing the Western World: Navalism, Empire, and State-Building in Germany and 
the United States Before World War I‖ (PhD Diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 32-3. While this 
passage describes ―navalism‖ in general, Bönker argues, and the author concurs, that Mahan‘s writings 
represent its American expression.  
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Mahan‘s ideas can be sorted into two categories: policy and strategy suggestions. 
Within the Navy, Mahan‘s policy suggestions—the importance of a large fleet and 
colonies foremost among them—went almost entirely unchallenged. Instead, discussion 
focused on his strategic and tactical thinking, which was less well-developed than his 
―big picture‖ ideas. Essentially, the basis of Mahan‘s thought, as laid out in The Influence 
of Sea Power, was service propaganda, an attempt to convince policymakers that a large, 
seagoing navy best suited the national interest. Overshadowed by this main purpose, the 
details of what to do with such a navy received less attention. While this was not a major 
problem prior to the Spanish-American War, once the U.S. was confirmed as a world 
power, the issue of how best to utilize the fleet became an issue of importance. Mahan, 
who had comparatively little experience with, and almost no interest in sea service, paid 
very little attention to the technological innovations of the day, and his writings failed to 
take new developments into account in any but the most superficial ways.  
Fisher, more in tune with the times, had a keen sense of the changes wrought by 
technology, writing in mid-1904 that the old reliance on battlefleets ―HAS BEEN 
ABSOLUTELY ALTERED!‖ by changes in technology like the mine and torpedo, 
concluding that battleships‘ ―one and only function—that of ultimate security of 
defence—is gone—lost! No one would seriously advocate building battleships merely to 
fight other battleships.‖28 Ironically  Mahan did exactly that, arguing at nearly the same 
time as Fisher that ―[b]ecause an expensive battleship may be removed from the field of 
                                                             
28Fisher, ―New Proposals,‖ 31.  
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action by an inexpensive torpedo, it by no means follows that control of the sea can be 
maintained by vessels differing [from] . . . the battleship.‖29 
As this example suggests, despite Mahan‘s importance to the Navy, his tactical 
and operational thought fundamentally remained in the nineteenth century, and was 
―unprepared…to fully appreciate . . . the transformation of naval warfare.‖30 The first 
years of the twentieth century may have indeed been an ―Age of Mahan‖ but it was only 
by breaking free of some of Mahan‘s views that the navy was able to move into a new era 
of naval thinking and seriously consider the issues of effectively using warships in 
combat.  
This process did not occur quietly. Traditionally, American adoption of 
dreadnoughts has been explained as a simple realization on the part of the American 
naval establishment that dreadnoughts were self-evidently superior. Indeed, in the 
historical literature, this shift from pre-dreadnoughts to dreadnoughts is treated as an 
almost-seamless transition. In reality, the change in American strategic culture that 
allowed for American dreadnoughts was a product of a contentious debate between 
Mahan and his supporters on one hand and a group of mostly younger officers, most 
prominently the gunnery expert William Sims on the other. Indeed, the debate was 
serious enough to require Congressional and presidential intervention. The standard line, 
that the Dreadnought, ―rendered all previous vessels obsolete,‖ may be true in hindsight, 
                                                             
29Alfred Thayer Mahan, ―To the Editor of the New York Sun,‖ May 9, 1904, in Letters and Papers of 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Volume III 1902-1914 eds. Robert Seager II and Doris Maguire (Annapolis, MD: 
Naval Institute Press, 1975), 91. 
30Felker, Testing American Sea Power, 31.  
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but it was far from obvious at the time.
31
 However, even as the strategic culture allowed 
for dreadnoughts, it could not move far enough to accommodate battlecruisers, which 
were not accepted in the Navy until the First World War. Although the Navy made strides 
in the early twentieth century, this cultural inflexibility retarded its development. 
                                                             
31Ronald Spector, Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State UP, 1974). 172. See also In Peace and War, ed. Kenneth J. Hagan (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1st ed. 1978), a standard history of the Navy. 
  
CHAPTER 2 
SETTING THE STAGE 
 
On September 28, 1903, William H. Moody, Theodore Roosevelt‘s second 
Secretary of the Navy, wrote Admiral George Dewey asking for the General Board‘s 
opinion on the size and composition of the fleet.
32
 While the General Board had made, 
and would continue to make, suggestions on each year‘s construction program, Moody 
asked a more general question: how big should the fleet eventually get? The response, 
received three weeks later, would remain the general principle behind the Board‘s 
construction requests up to the First World War. The General Board wanted ―an effective 
fleet of 48 [battleships]. Sustained [cruising] speed—16 knots. . . . Maximum steaming 
radius 6,000 miles.‖ Additionally, this ideal fleet would contain 24 19-knot armored 
cruisers, with a radius of 9,000 miles, as well as 48 protected cruisers, 48 scout cruisers 
and 48 destroyers.
33
 
 This plan had two striking features. The first is the sheer size of the General 
Board‘s proposal. At the time, the Navy only possessed 10 battleships, and even that 
number included ships commissioned as far back as 1890, clearly unsuited for frontline 
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combat. By way of comparison, the Royal Navy, depending on the method of counting, 
had a front-line strength of approximately 30 battleships.
34
 To create a fleet larger than 
the Royal Navy was more than national defense; the General Board proposed to make the 
United States the world‘s foremost naval power.  
 At the same time, the letter assumed a great deal of technological stagnation. 
Depending on the number of battleships authorized each year, the 48-battleship fleet 
would have been completed sometime between 1914 and 1919. While the Board 
prudently did not specify armament or displacements, it did specify speed, assuming that 
a reasonable speed in 1903 would remain so sixteen years later. This assumption of 
technological stagnation would soon be proven unrealistic, but it was well in line with the 
Mahanian culture of the Navy, where technology took a back seat to other considerations.  
 Indeed, a year earlier Mahan had made a forceful argument against the need for 
speed in battleships in a letter written for President Roosevelt, going further than the 
Board and weighing in against increases in size as well. Since ―the battle ship is meant 
always to act with others, not alone,‖ homogeneity was more desirable than maximizing 
capabilities: ―Strategically and yet more tactically . . . the battle ship . . . should be 
harmonized by an antecedent determination of a size to which battleships must conform 
during a measurable future.‖35 In other words, homogeneity created a more manageable 
fleet in battle, outweighing any gains from improved fighting power.  
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 Mahan went on to apply similar arguments to speed. ―Speed is under distinct 
limitations as a strategic quality,‖ he argued, ―and as a tactical unit it can be sufficiently 
insured . . . by the armored cruiser . . . in which speed is purchased by some sacrifice of 
fighting strength—an exception for exceptional purposes.‖36 While Mahan was no fan of 
armored cruisers, he saw their speed as a somewhat useful adjunct to the main work of 
the fleet, but he did not see speed as a major issue in battleship design. 
 Although it is true that Mahan and the General Board spoke with the loudest, 
most authoritative voices on naval policy, they were not the only sources of discussion on 
the topic. Indeed the dreadnought, or at least the all-big-gun concept, was developed 
independently in the United States by low and mid-ranking officers well before Tsushima 
or the British battleship. In early 1902, Lt. Matthew Signor, writing in Proceedings, 
suggested something similar to the Dreadnought, a battleship organized on the principles 
of ―heavy batteries and . . . long range guns.‖37 Signor went on to suggest that such a ship 
could be given enough speed to take on some of the scouting and screening functions of 
armored cruisers, which would reduce the need for such ships, and free up more 
resources for the all-important battleships. Signor suggested that with his proposed 
battleship ―when it comes to a fleet engagement, we shall be stronger than if more of our 
men and money had been put into cruisers.‖38 A similar article the next year by Lt. 
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Homer Poundstone suggested that for battleships, ―[t]he biggest is the best,‖ in order to 
carry more armor, bigger engines, and larger guns into battle.
39
 
 While the logical extension of these arguments suggested something much like 
HMS Dreadnought, their recommendations were general, rather than specific. However, a 
Lt.Cmdr. W.I. Chambers, attending the Naval War College in July 1903, made a much 
more specific and influential intervention, including a very basic design sketch that was 
later forwarded to the General Board by Captain Sperry, the president of the NWC, in 
early 1904. Like many officers, Chambers believed that the introduction of large (11‖ or 
12‖) guns made an increase in average range during battle more likely.40 Assuming 
longer ranges, he argued that ―[t]he intermediate calibers cannot do the work against 
armor at probable ranges and the unarmored portion of the ship may be pretty thoroughly 
wrecked without interfering with the efficiency of the main battery.‖41 At the same time, 
―the battleship of today carries so many medium and light guns that the distraction on 
board . . . must count against accuracy and control.‖42 In other words, Chambers had 
sketched out a preliminary design of an ―all big-gun‖ ship well before Fisher even began 
his tenure as First Sea Lord. 
 Chambers‘s suggestions must have made an impact, because even before Sperry‘s 
letter reached Washington, the General Board discussed a ―new and untried idea [which] 
had been much talked of at the Naval War College last summer,‖ adding, ―a preliminary 
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plan of such a ship was made. . . . Some officers regard it as the battleship of the 
future.‖43 The Board went further and suggested to the Secretary that ―the Bureau of 
Construction and Repair . . . prepare a tentative design for a battleship with a battery of 
twelve heavy turret guns, none of which shall be less than 10‖ and at least four of which 
shall be 12.‖44 Although the eventual design, the South Carolina-class ships, were not 
laid down until late 1906, this was an early adoption of the all-big-gun concept, almost 
certainly before American officers knew of similar developments in Britain.
45
 
 While the General Board‘s request is indicative of rather impressive forward 
thinking, one must also keep in mind what the Board missed. Speed was considered a 
key, if not the key, component of the Dreadnought‘s design by Fisher‘s committee, and 
while Signor suggested the importance of speed, neither Chambers nor the Board 
considered the issue of speed when discussing the importance of heavy batteries. The 
Navy, at least in its upper echelons, adhered to Mahan‘s worldview, which suggested that 
maneuver would be unimportant in the naval wars of the future, both because of his focus 
on major battles and because of his assumptions about the nature of those battles.  
 Although Mahan arrived at his ideas from intense study of naval history, the 
decades prior to the turn of century afforded very few examples of naval combat between 
roughly equal fleets, which in practice meant that American conceptions of naval warfare 
rested on pure theory. The Russo-Japanese War, which started just days after the General 
Board‘s request for plans, would provide the necessary test of contemporary ships and 
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theory and in the end suggested that some of Mahan‘s key assumptions were outdated. 
Beyond the intrinsic importance of the territory in question, the war represented the first 
conflict between major powers since the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, and the first 
test of modern (steel, turreted) warships. Even before the major battle of the naval 
campaign, Tsushima in late May 1905, naval thinkers were drawing conclusions from the 
Japanese attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur, and its subsequent blockade. 
 In early May 1904, three months after the war‘s start, Mahan was already 
claiming that the lessons of the war backed up his theories. In an article for the New York 
Sun, ―The Probability of the Survival of the Battleship,‖ Mahan argued that, despite the 
sinking of the Russian battleship Petropavlovsk by a mine, battleships were still the key 
to naval power. He then went on to reiterate his objections to speed as a major 
consideration in battleship design, arguing that battleships ―are meant to act strictly in 
concert with others; an isolated battleship is an anomaly; and a speed much below the 
highest is all that is likely to be got from several together.‖46 More importantly, though, 
Mahan believed that the sinking of the Russian ship confirmed his position on battleship 
size: ―the fate of the Petropavlovsk comes with the old warning not to put too many eggs 
in one basket, reinforcing the military suggestion to increase numbers by putting some 
limit on size. . . . . [I]t is desirable . . . to regulate the size of the battleship so that the loss 
of one may not be excessively felt.‖47 
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 Again, however, Mahan‘s ideas hardly went unchallenged. Writing in 
Proceedings the next year, Cmdr. Bradley Fiske, a reform-minded officer who would 
later serve as Aide for Operations, took the exact opposite stance regarding battleships.
 48
  
Speed, Fiske argued, was among the most important characteristics of individual ships 
and fleets, as ―[t]he faster fleet can increase and decrease the range at pleasure; and even 
withdraw from, or go into battle, whenever it thinks best.‖49 On the issue of size, Fiske 
was even more adamant. Without providing specifics, Fiske maintained that a battleship‘s 
effectiveness was, at least in part, a function of size. Only a large ship could carry the 
necessary engines, armor, and guns and so battleships needed to be as large as 
scientifically possible.
50
 While this viewpoint took aim at Mahan‘s ideas, Fiske 
maintained Mahan‘s single-minded focus on major fleet actions.  
  Even civilian writers intervened in this debate. In an editorial for the Navy 
League Journal, league president and ex-Secretary of the Navy Benjamin Tracy, 
expressed views similar to Fiske‘s, concluding that ―[t]he experiences of war have shown  
in conclusive fashion . . . that the main reliance, the main standby, in any navy worthy the 
name must be the great battle-ships, heavily armored and heavily gunned . . . so 
powerfully armed that they can inflict the maximum of damage upon our opponents . . . 
[and] so well protected that they can suffer a severe hammering in return.‖51 Although 
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Tracy‘s argument was not as explicit as Fiske‘s, the qualities demanded by Tracy also 
presupposed as large a ship as possible. 
 These two pieces argue against some of Mahan‘s deeply-held opinions, yet both 
men owed an intellectual debt to Mahan. The two articles simply assumed that the 
purpose of a navy was to fight major fleet actions, a key assumption of Mahan‘s and a 
major tenet of the Navy‘s strategic culture.52 Indeed, Fiske and Tracy were equally 
contemptuous of cruisers, ships seen as too weak to stand up to the punishment of battle. 
Fiske argued that the role of armored cruisers was ―not accurately defined,‖ making them 
a complete waste of money unless armored to a near-battleship standard.
53
 Tracy, along 
the same lines, noted, ―cruiser after cruiser has been destroyed whenever the hostile 
squadrons have gotten within range of one another‘s weapons.‖54 While there was debate 
about some of Mahan‘s conclusions, his key assumptions on the nature of naval warfare 
remained unchallenged. For American naval thinkers, the Navy existed for major battles, 
and anything distracting from that mission was unnecessary. Even though cruisers could 
and would play a role in major battles, like the upcoming Battle of Tsushima, they were 
designed for other roles, such as screening. In the early twentieth century Navy, it made 
cruisers grudgingly accepted at best and a useless drain on resources at worst. 
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 The General Board also weighed in on the early stages of the Russo-Japanese 
War, and argued that the course of the war only intensified their earlier support of an all 
big-gun ship. In October 1904, the Board sent Paul Morton, the new Secretary, a letter 
suggesting that the preliminary design requested by the Board after receipt of Chambers‘s 
initial plan be the basis for the next class of battleship. The war, claimed the Board, had 
confirmed that because of ―[t]he greater accuracy at long ranges of heavy guns . . . 
[and]their greater collective effectiveness against armored ships . . . battles will be most 
often fought at long range,‖ which demanded ―increasing the number of heavy guns at 
the expense of the intermediate battery.‖55 As a result, the Board again recommended a 
battleship with ―a battery of heavy turret guns, none of which shall be less than 10‖, and 
at least four of which shall be 12‖ without intermediate battery,‖ although the letter was 
silent on the issue of ideal speed.
56
 
 Indeed, if one compares the resultant South Carolina design to the Dreadnought, 
the differences between the American and British navies stand out. Although the two 
ships were designed around the same time to fulfill the same role, differences are 
apparent. While the South Carolina would have a uniform battery, it would do so at the 
same size and speed of her Connecticut-class predecessors: 16,000 tons and 18 knots, 
respectively.
57
 On the other hand, Dreadnought was a full three knots faster than the 
preceding Lord Nelsons, 21 knots against 18, and displaced 18,000, as opposed to 16,000 
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tons.
58
 In the event of battle, a fleet of Dreadnoughts would have been able to steam 
circles around the slower South Carolinas and carried heavier armament: ten 12‖ guns to 
South Carolina’s eight. 
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CHAPTER 3 
TSUSHIMA AND ITS AFTERMATH 
  
 The Battle of Tsushima, May 27-8, 1905, could not challenge the primacy of 
major battle in the minds of Americans, but it challenged assumptions about the nature of 
those battles. On its face, though, Tsushima was a poor test. The fresh Japanese 
Combined fleet faced the Russian Baltic Fleet, at the end of its round-the-world journey, 
in need of a refit and overloaded with coal. With a newer, faster, better-maintained fleet, 
in many ways Admiral Togo Heihachiro needed to do little more than show up. While the 
battle did take place at heretofore unprecedented ranges, beyond 8,000 yards at times, the 
fleets were close enough for secondary weapons to be brought to bear. Naturally, the 
Japanese fleet was victorious, ensuring Japanese control of the seas around Korea and 
Manchuria for the remainder of the war.
59
 While Tsushima was far from an ideal contest 
between two equal fleets, it was also the only major fleet action for writers to analyze 
since Lissa in 1866.  
 Among the first American responses to Tsushima was written by Lt.Cmdr 
William Sims. Although he was a relatively junior officer, he was the Navy‘s foremost 
expert on gunnery. In 1900 Sims, then a lieutenant, was assigned to USS Kentucky, a 
battleship on the China Station. There, he was able to observe the development of a new 
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system of targeting and firing developed by a British officer, Captain Percy Scott, also 
stationed in China.
60
 Indeed, Sims was so taken with Scott‘s system that he sent a letter 
about it directly to President Roosevelt in late 1901. The next year, Roosevelt personally 
recalled Sims to Washington where he was promoted and installed in the newly created 
position of Inspector of Target Practice, while serving as an unofficial naval advisor to 
Roosevelt.
61
 
 Soon after Tsushima Sims prepared a memorandum on battleship design for 
Roosevelt. In it, Sims laid out the ―Requirements of a Modern First-Class Battleship,‖ 
ostensibly based on seven lessons from the recent battle: 
(1) The increased and increasing rate of fire of heavy guns (12-inch); (2) The 
established accuracy of such guns at long ranges . . . (3) The known ability of heavy 
guns to insure penetration . . . at all practicable ranges; (4) the ability inherent in a 
broadside fire of numerous heavy guns to hold off (or sink or disable) a ship with 
guns that are inferior either in caliber or number; (5) the vital consideration of fire-
control . . . with a battery of heavy guns that are uniform in caliber; (6) The great 
importance of superiority in speed; (7) The necessity for high water-line protection.    
. . . The above facts are established on the practically unanimous opinion of the 
principal naval authorities who have discussed recent naval events.
62
 
 
Sims, who had visited England in mid-1905 and maintained very good relations with 
important British officers,  especially Scott, knew the basic parameters of the 
forthcoming Dreadnought and here he essentially wrote a justification of the dreadnought 
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ideal. Where Fisher‘s original ideas were derived from theory, Sims gave those same 
concepts the legitimacy of assumed empirical proof. Not only did Sims claim the 
legitimacy of the battle but concluded the letter by suggesting that the U.S. copy HMS 
Dreadnought outright, the assumption being that the foremost naval power was worth 
emulation: ―Great Britain has laid down one battleship . . . of 18,000 tons trial 
displacement, 21 knots speed, and a battery of twelve 12-inch guns . . . [I]t is apparent 
that a vessel carrying a smaller number of such guns cannot be considered a modern 
vessel . . . capable of performing her full duty in the line of battle.‖63 
 Sims‘s letter brought up two more key points. Sims, a gunnery specialist, was 
convinced that high speed was necessary for modern battleships, mentioning it as a key 
lesson from the battle. After all, what was the use of heavy guns without the ability to 
deploy them as advantageously as possible? Still, this justification of speed was subtly 
different from that put forth by Fisher‘s committee. In discussing battleships, the 
Committee on Designs argued that ―the first desideratum in every type of fighting vessel 
is a greater speed than that possessed by a similar class of the enemy‘s ships.‖64 While 
they went on to discuss speed in the context of gunnery, it is clear that in Britain, at least 
in the upper echelons of the Navy, speed was considered to be desirable in and of itself, 
not just as an aid to firing.  
 Sims also considered the experience of Tsushima as corroboration of his previous 
views. Almost to a man, those who wrote on the subject of Tsushima were firmly 
convinced that the battle validated their preconceived opinions. While this would prove 
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unproblematic for writers like Sims, whose views were basically sound, other writers 
whose views were somewhat behind the times failed to use Tsushima as a learning 
experience, and cherry-picked examples that seemed to fit with prior worldviews.  
 Captain Richard Wainwright, later the Aide for Operations, wrote the first major 
published piece on Tsushima in the U.S. Rather than discussing the battle as a whole, 
Wainwright zeroed in on firepower, which he considered the key factor in the Japanese 
victory. The article was essentially an endorsement of the all big-gun ship, with empirical 
evidence from Tsushima replacing theory. The battle, Wainwright argued, showed that 
intermediate batteries were useless. While they could devastate a ship at close range, 
another vessel armed solely with large guns could pummel it without coming into range 
of the intermediate battery. For Wainwright, Tsushima provided a textbook example; 
while Togo‘s battleships had the standard intermediate batteries, the battle took place at 
ranges where the Japanese advantage in heavy guns provided the margin of superiority.
65
 
Tellingly, Wainwright neglected to mention speed as an important factor.  
 Captain Seaton Schroeder, the head of Naval Intelligence at the time, and an ex 
officio General Board member, weighed into the debate in early 1906 with a more 
thorough treatment of the battle. Written with the benefit of more time in which to 
consider the battle, Schroeder‘s article, ―Gleanings from the Sea of Japan,‖ attempted to 
lay out the lessons learned from Tsushima. Schroeder came down firmly in the long-
range camp regarding the nature of future battles and suggested the ranges of Tsushima 
made both rams and intermediate batteries obsolete, while making all big-gun ships a 
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necessity.
66
 Tsushima ―developed nothing new concerning the influence of speed,‖ 
Schroeder wrote, ―[t]he victory was won by the faster fleet, but that does not necessarily 
carry the conclusion that speed was a determining factor,‖ although he admitted that 
speed had ―an undeniable value . . . in attaining positions of strategical and even of 
tactical importance in individual operations.‖67 All told, Schroeder‘s was a rather tepid 
endorsement of speed, especially compared to contemporary accounts, many British, 
which highlighted speed as providing a key margin of superiority for Admiral Togo.
68
 
 Schroeder was more definite in criticizing armored cruisers, the predecessors of 
battlecruisers, attacking their ever-increasing size and cost. He went so far as to claim, 
―throughout this entire war armored cruisers have played no important part,‖ and that 
―the armored cruiser has failed to justify its existence.‖69 Instead, all available money for 
large vessels should be funneled into the production of battleships. Despite subsequent 
changes, including the introduction of battlecruisers in Britain, Germany, and Japan, 
Schroeder‘s opinions basically summarize official Navy policy for the next several years. 
After Tsushima, the Navy laid down no armored cruisers until the 1920s.   
 Tsushima also made a strong impression on the General Board. While the original 
design parameters of the South Carolina class called for a mixed battery of different-
sized heavy guns, by September 1905 the board was convinced that ―the fire of a mixed 
battery at fighting ranges cannot be accurately placed when two or more calibers . . . are 
                                                             
66Cpt. Seaton Schroeder, ―Gleanings from the Sea of Japan,‖ Proceedings, 32.1 (March 1906): 76.  
67Schroeder, ―Gleanings from the Sea of Japan,‖ 76-8.  
68See, for example, Julian Corbett‘s Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), originally written as a confidential Admiralty report. 
69Schroeder, ―Gleanings from the Sea of Japan,‖ 91-2.  
 `  
 
32 
firing at the same time.‖70 Instead, ―the modern battleship must have a homogenous 
battery of 12-inch guns.‖71 Furthermore, the Board suggested a thawing on the issue of 
speed, claiming that ―speed must be obtained to as great a degree as possible after the 
greatest number of properly protected big guns have been secured
.‖72 
 In the Board‘s October 1905 ―Report on Building Program‖ the basic parameters 
of the next class of battleships were laid down: ―Main Battery to consist of not less than 
ten 12-inch guns. . . . Speed not less than 19 knots for four hours.‖73Although the 
proposed speed for the new battleships, later Delaware and North Dakota was one knot 
faster than those of the South Carolinas, the Board‘s endorsement of speed was still tepid 
compared to their British counterparts.
74
  
 Since almost all American naval officers and civilian ―navalists‖ were products of 
a Mahanian culture—even Sims, his future antagonist—Mahan‘s opinion still carried 
extra weight, not only because of his prominence outside of the Navy, but also because of 
his status as the Navy‘s foremost mind. More to the point, previous discussions on the 
subject, while based on a Mahanian worldview, obviously failed to match the impact of 
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Mahanian thought directly from the source. Although his ―Reflections, Historic and 
Other, Suggested by the Battle of the Japan Sea,‖ was not published in Proceedings until 
June 1906, it represented the most thorough and credible attempt to integrate the lessons 
of the battle into the Mahanian worldview. As Mahan himself realized, a great deal of 
previous naval theory ―was necessarily discussed and determined upon a priori 
reasoning,‖ and Tsushima gave him the chance to ―see what further light may seem to be 
thrown . . . by the events of the war itself.‖75 
 As one might expect, Mahan began his piece by discussing the value of speed. 
Mahan started this section by discussing speed in a strategic, rather than tactical, context. 
Mahan wrote under the assumption that ―to get to Vladivostok [the Russian objective] 
without fighting was impossible under any probable conditions of speed.‖76 On that 
rather tenuous base, he proceeded to clarify his position through rhetorical questions: 
―What bearing would the highest speed of [Russian] battle ships have had upon [Russian] 
movements? . . . [W]hat advantage would it be if the gain of time [in meeting the 
Japanese fleet] has been due to speed obtained at the sacrifice of fighting power? . . . 
[W]ould it have been worth while  for the Russians . . . to have 2 knots greater fleet speed 
. . . to achieve the mere result of running away?‖77 
 Mahan‘s stated assumption, that battle was inevitable regardless of speed, was 
questionable; the gap between Korea and Japan is about 100 miles wide at its narrowest 
point, enough space for a well-led faster fleet to slip through while refusing combat. 
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More important, though, was his unspoken assumption that speed necessarily came at the 
expense of ―fighting power.‖ The position of Admiral Fisher‘s design committee and 
Americans such as Sims was that speed‘s contribution to fighting power was very 
significant indeed, Fisher going even further to defined speed as a virtue in its own right. 
Even if one defines ―fighting power‖ at its most narrow, as solely weapons carried, 
Mahan was only right up to a point. Dreadnought, which Mahan knew enough about to 
discuss in the article, managed to combine a great deal of firepower and speed by being 
larger than other contemporary battleships. Even in the face of empirical evidence, 
Mahan refused to change the parameters of his worldview, and his final word was ―speed 
is at best a less valuable factor . . . than fighting power . . . it must be kept severely in its 
proper place of subordination in the design of battle ships.‖78 
 Mahan then went on to discuss firepower. In his reading of the battle, long-range 
fire with heavy guns was not the key instrument of destruction. Rather, the battle 
confirmed his pre-existing notion that ―the so-called ‗secondary battery‘ is really entitled 
to the name ‗primary,‘ because its effect is exerted mainly on the personnel.‖79 His only 
attempt to back up that assertion with data from the battle was a rather weak argument 
that because most Russian ships were sunk by gunfire instead of torpedoes, the more 
numerous, faster-firing, secondary batteries must have played the main role.‖80 To attack 
the prevailing opinion that heavy, long-range gunnery won the day, he was reduced to 
claiming that fleets reliant on long-range fire ―assumed the moral tone and temperament 
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associated with the indisposition to close. . . . [T]he navy which for any reasons 
habitually seeks to keep its enemy at a distance . . . usually fails to achieve more than a 
defensive success for the occasion.‖81 Of course, this claim had nothing to do with the 
battle; the Japanese fleet that made use of its long-range weapons achieved a resounding 
victory.  
 Along the same lines, Mahan left aside the specific case of Tsushima to fire his 
own broadside against newer strains of naval theory and the Dreadnought, their 
exemplar. The British battleship, Mahan claimed, ―has no immunity from the common lot 
of all battle ships. In a fleet to-day her speed will be that of her slower sisters; more 
Dreadnoughts must be built to keep up with her; and upon them in turn, according to the 
prevalent law of progress, she will be a drag, for here successors will excel her.‖82 Of 
course, Mahan was quite right here, but he simply hit upon the essential dynamic of 
modern arms races, reliant on capabilities as well as numbers. Rather than being a 
problem, it was merely the new paradigm.  
 What made Mahan‘s thinking antiquated was not the problem he identified, but in 
thinking of it as a problem rather than a basic parameter of modern policy. To Mahan, 
however, ―[t]his willful premature antiquating of good vessels is a growing and wanton 
evil . . . The moral effect . . . is inducing in the Navy as in the public a simple trust in 
bigness, and what is worse, an absence of trust in anything but bigness.‖83 Here, Mahan 
betrayed his fundamental misunderstanding of naval policy in the new century. The 
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fascination with new, larger, battleships had nothing to do with their size, but instead the 
capabilities that size allowed: a faster top speed and more heavy guns. 
 To Mahan, though, this focus on ―bigness‖ ignored the important factors in 
determining naval effectiveness. While he conceded that ―if all other things—skill 
courage, numbers, combinations, fortitude—are the same on both sides, bigness . . . will 
carry the day,‖ he went on to ask, ―but when have all other things been the same? We are 
putting in the foremost place of consideration that which military history shows to be the 
least of several factors.‖84 This viewpoint may have made sense when technological 
change was glacial and a ship of the line could serve for several decades, but in the new 
paradigm, Mahan‘s views were simply old-fashioned. If nothing else, Mahan‘s 
―Reflections,‖ showed just how hard—if not impossible—a task it was to reconcile pure 
Mahanian thought with the example of Tsushima.  
The best encapsulation critique of Mahan came from William Sims, the gunnery 
expert and unofficial advisor to President Roosevelt. In fact, although Roosevelt 
maintained a cordial relationship with Mahan, he was firmly convinced by 1906 that the 
all-big-gun ship was the future of naval design, no doubt influenced by Sims and Sims‘s 
1905 memorandum suggesting the adoption of dreadnought-type ships. At any rate, after 
the publication of Mahan‘s article, Roosevelt asked Sims for his opinion on the piece. 
Sims ran with the assignment and wrote a 26-page rebuttal of Mahan‘s argument. This 
letter became arguably the most influential piece of naval theory written in the U.S. 
during this era. Not only was the letter later turned into a pamphlet and mailed to selected 
naval officers in the U.S. and U.K., but it was also reprinted in Proceedings and, along 
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with Mahan‘s ―Reflections,‖ made it to Congress as a Senate Document, ―Size of 
Battleships.‖85  
 The letter to Roosevelt started respectfully enough, with Sims claiming ―had he 
[Mahan] been in possession of certain important information, his conclusions would have 
been considerably modified.‖86 In truth, it is clear from the letter and other writings that 
Sims saw Mahan‘s entire mode of thinking as flawed, hardly something that could be 
rectified with better information. Despite the respectful tone adopted at the beginning, 
what Sims attempted was a nothing less than a thorough dismantling of Mahan‘s views 
on battleships. In the article version, Sims went on to claim that Mahan‘s ―conclusions 
are . . . opposed to those reached by practically all naval officers who have given this 
subject serious consideration; but so great is the weight of Captain Mahan‘s opinions that 
they would doubtless be accepted,‖ by non-experts.87 Still, it must be reiterated that Sims 
was, in essence, trying to save Mahan the theorist from Mahan the commentator; 
throughout his career Sims remained devoted to ―those measures required to build a great 
fleet of the kind that Captain Mahan advocated—one prepared to defeat any opponent 
and able to achieve general and lasting command of the sea.‖88 As contentious as this 
debate was, it was a generational spat, not a culture shift.  
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 Sims mirrored Mahan‘s approach and began by discussing the issue of speed, 
explicitly linking it to what Mahan called ―fighting power.‖ In addition to allowing 
Togo‘s fleet to engage the Russian fleet in the first place, superior speed gave the 
Japanese commander the ability to change his position ―with reference to the head of the 
enemy‘s fleet . . . [and] the battle therefore resolved itself into a competition between the 
fire-control officers of the two fleets as to which could make the most hits under 
conditions selected by the Japanese—these conditions being, of course, very unequal.‖89 
Instead of Mahan‘s categorization of speed as simply a tool of the weak, Sims believed 
speed allowed Togo to press his advantage and put his ships in the best possible position 
to attack the Russian fleet. Speaking more universally, he claimed ―a superiority of speed 
that will enable a fleet frequently to concentrate its fire on an enemy . . . is more 
important than the additional guns corresponding to the weight (in boilers and engines) 
required to give this superiority in speed.‖90 
 When Sims turned to gunnery, his personal specialty, his critiques became even 
more pointed as the Navy‘s Inspector of Target Practice brought his technical knowledge 
to bear. While Sims considered Mahan misguided on the subject of speed, the 
letter/article painted Mahan as entirely ignorant on the subject of modern gunnery. Sims 
was familiar with and an advocate of Admiral Scott‘s fire control reforms in Great 
Britain, where guns were aimed from a central location instead of singly. This 
development, Sims argued, made ―the evolution of the all-big-gun battleship . . . a 
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foregone conclusion,‖ as a uniform caliber was necessary for optimal efficiency.91 
Instead of arguing what mix of guns to put on a battleship, the new important decision 
was deciding, ―what [single] caliber for each class of ship,‖ a question that would always 
be answered by the largest practicable guns.
92
 
 Sims then turned to Mahan‘s advocacy of smaller caliber weapons. 
Unsurprisingly, Sims found that Mahan‘s ideas were ―based upon certain mistaken 
assumptions in regard to the efficiency of these [secondary battery] guns.‖93 Indeed, Sims 
argued, a fleet of dreadnoughts, ―at modern battle ranges will actually deliver,‖ more 
firepower ―than a fleet of mixed-battery ships of the same nominal power,‖ since bigger 
guns fired heavier shells and were more accurate at the longer ranges Sims assumed for 
future battles.
94
 
 Even assuming that Mahan‘s preferred six-to-eight inch guns could hit the target, 
Sims pointed out that on the Dreadnought the fighting crew, save for the fire control 
party atop a mast, would be behind the heavy armor belt, ―therefore, neither the ship nor 
her personnel can be materially injured by small caliber guns.‖95 Indeed, ―it would be 
extremely unwise to equip our new ships with a large number of small guns that are 
incapable of inflicting material damage‖ to enemy fleets.96 At the end of his discussion of 
gunnery, Sims even allowed a bit of naked disdain to show through: ―As for the 
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comparative moral effect of the explosion of 12-inch and 6-inch shells, it seems to be that 
when we compare the difference in weight of bursting charges (that of the 12-inch is 38 
pounds, while the 6-inch is only 4 pounds) . . . there can be no doubt that the moral effect 
of the former is very much greater.‖97 
 Size, then, was more than a ―simple trust in bigness‖ to Sims. Instead, ―the reason 
for the great increase in displacement . . . [was] simply that you cannot build an efficient 
[battle] ship . . . less than about 20,000 tons because you cannot mount more than two 12-
inch turrets [four guns] to advantage upon a battleship of much less displacement.‖98 
That, perhaps, is putting his case a bit strongly. After all, the 18,000-ton Dreadnought 
mounted five turrets. Still, as Sims made clear, the demands of modern war required 
bigger battleships.  
Sims ended his letter by claiming that Mahan‘s conclusions were ―founded 
largely upon mistaken facts, mistaken principles of gun-fire, and upon an apparent failure 
to consider the inherent . . . qualities of large vessels.‖99 While previous naval theorists 
had disagreed with Mahan, none, at least within the Navy, had gone directly after him in 
so public a manner. As a result, this piece became particularly influential within naval 
circles and, as mentioned earlier, even reached the attention of Congress. Throughout, 
Sims‘s argument was couched in terms of capabilities—large guns, large displacement, 
high speed—before classification; the specific capabilities of the ship were more 
important that whether or not it was a battleship.  
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 Roosevelt, well versed in naval affairs, took the time to enclose a copy of the 
pamphlet of Sims‘s argument in a letter to Mahan, requesting a response.100 Mahan‘s first 
response, two days after receiving the letter, was wholly inadequate; Mahan resorted to 
trying to deflect the question: ―I do not pretend to be fully equipped in tactical resource, 
and hold myself retired, as a rule from such discussion, though I present my views when 
asked. The Institute asked me for a paper.‖101 
 His more substantial response sent two weeks later was hardly more convincing. 
At one point, Mahan claimed ―the tactical advantage constituted by superior speed. . . 
confers the offensive,‖ a contradiction in spirit, and most likely fact, from his 
―Reflections‖ article, which claimed that that speed gave little more than the power to run 
away.
102
 Although the letter did try to rebut Sims, by the end Mahan was reduced to 
conceding that ―[t]he field is one which should be exhaustively studied by men younger 
and less occupied than I; by the coming men, in short, rather than by one of the past.‖103 
 The ―coming men‖ certainly concurred. In the aftermath of his letter‘s publication 
as a pamphlet and Proceedings article, Sims received a number of approving letters from 
American and British officers. The responses of his peers, mid-level officers, were often 
quite vitriolic. To Fiske, Sims‘s paper showed that ―Mahan fell down because. . . he 
applied his general principles to conditions that did not exist, and so arrived at 
conclusions absolutely false.‖104 An officer of Sims‘s rank ―regretted that I was not on 
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the opposition side, for then I should have had the pleasure of being thoroughly 
convinced that I was entirely wrong.‖ He later expressed ―surprise that a man for the 
soundness of whose opinions I had conceived a great respect should write such a weak 
article.‖105 The most vicious letter, though, claimed that ―it would be an excellent thing 
for the Service,‖ if Mahan, who ―never was brilliant as an officer. . . would keep quiet. . . 
and solace his old age with pleasant historical and literary reminiscence.‖106 
 Sims‘s article did more than encourage true believers, though. Senior officers also 
found Sims‘s work impressive. Charles Beresford, the commander of the Royal Navy‘s 
Mediterranean Fleet, to whom Sims had sent a pamphlet (despite the pamphlet‘s cover 
which declared it ―For private circulation among U.S. Naval Officers only‖107), asked 
permission to send the article along to the Admiralty.
108
 Closer to home, Stephen B. 
Luce, the founder and first president of the Naval War College sent a congratulatory 
letter, although he stopped short of attacking Mahan, his longtime colleague and friend. 
The most thoughtful response among the senior leaders came from Rear Admiral Caspar 
F. Goodrich, the commander of the Pacific Fleet: ―I used to think with Mahan but, a 
couple of years ago, I changed my mind. . . I realized that nothing mechanical will stay 
‗put‘—that you may fix a size to anything you please. . . but—while you back is turned 
the . . . thing has swelled to twice its former size.‖109 
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 Outside of the Navy itself, the Navy League, the main civilian organization of 
―navalists,‖ took Sims‘s side, which was unsurprising given that Sims had written a 
number of anonymous journal articles for them over the years. A January 1907 editorial 
in the League‘s new journal called the prospect of the Navy building more 
predreadnoughts ―a lamentable and inexcusable blunder. . . . What is the use of 
deliberately making a new ship inferior to those abroad?
110
 The next month, another dealt 
specifically with the dispute, taking the stance that Mahan lacked ―the technical 
knowledge fairly to be demanded from an ‗authority.‘‖ Tellingly, though, the author also 
suggested that Mahan failed to utilize ―a consistent and rigid application of his own 
principles,‖ suggesting again that the problem was not Mahan‘s ideas, but his insufficient 
familiarity with modern technology to effectively apply them.
111
 
 It did not take long for the influence of Sims‘s paper to spread outside of the naval 
community. During debate over the 1907 Navy Estimates, Roosevelt himself wrote the 
House Naval Affairs Committee and asked for two battleships ―of the maximum size and 
speed and with their primary battery of all 12-inch guns,‖ demonstrating the influence of 
Sims‘s ideas. Indeed, it is very possible that Sims ghostwrote the letter.112 Additionally, 
both Sims and Wainwright, who had also written an article on behalf of all-big-gun ships, 
were invited to the House Naval Committee to discuss the issue in late 1906.
113
 While 
                                                             
110―Don‘t give up the Dreadnought‖ The Navy, 1.1 (January 1907): 5. In late 1906, The Navy League 
Journal folded, and the Navy League joined forces with a preexisting publication to create The Navy.  
111Benjamin Baker, ―Mahan Sims, and the Facts,‖ The Navy, 1.2 (February 1907): 18.  
112Theodore Roosevelt, ―Increase of Navy—Letter from the President,‖ January 11, 1907, Hearings Before 
the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives on Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of 
the Navy, 1906-1907 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907), 367. 
113Hearings Before the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives on Estimates Submitted 
by the Secretary of the Navy, 1906-1907 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907).  
 `  
 
44 
neither man said anything new, the fact that Congress asked them to testify highlighted 
the effect those articles, especially Sims‘s, had at the time.  
 More importantly, Sims had an effect on the Navy‘s professional leadership. Not 
only was his article influential, but on a trip England in late 1906, he was secretly 
allowed on the still-uncommissioned Dreadnought, ―principally through personal 
considerations,‖ obtained from senior British officers and composed a report on her for 
the Office of Naval Intelligence, which called the Dreadnought ―the greatest modern 
advance in the design of ships that are intended to fight in the open sea.‖114 Although the 
intelligence dossier contained little in the way of new information, it and the article 
undoubtedly played a role in the General Board‘s acceptance of the dreadnought type in 
January 1907.
115
 The General Board‘s secretary later recorded the memorandum in favor 
of dreadnoughts as ―setting forth the arguments in favor of battleships of large 
displacements, of great offensive and defensive power and provided with a battery of one 
caliber heavy guns,‖ a neat paraphrase of the title of Sims‘s published article.116 While 
speed was not mentioned in the letter, the resultant Delaware-class battleships shared the 
same 21-knot top speed as the Dreadnought.
117
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  Despite the contentious debate between Sims and Mahan, the General Board came 
down on the side of dreadnought type battleships and independently developed an all-big-
gun design. This was because the Dreadnought did not challenge the dominant Mahanian 
strategic vision of the Navy at the time, while being clearly superior that her predecessors 
at the business of fighting and winning major battles. Even though Mahan himself railed 
against all-big-gun ships, this was, as Sims demonstrated, due more to unfamiliarity with 
modern equipment and practice than any sort of larger mental block. To the General 
Board, Sims, and the Navy at large, dreadnoughts represented the best way to contest 
major fleet actions, still seen as the only proper use for a navy. In other words, 
dreadnoughts were consistent with the Navy‘s larger strategic culture.  
 Although it ended with a consensus, the struggle to bring dreadnoughts into the 
fleet was intense enough to demand congressional attention and presidential intervention. 
By way of contrast, Fisher‘s other new ship, the battlecruiser, also inspired intense 
feelings, but this time all on the same side of the debate. The dreadnought episode 
demonstrated that the Navy‘s Mahanian culture was robust enough to recognize clear 
progress, but early American responses to Fisher‘s battlecruisers show the limits of that 
culture. 
  
CHAPTER 4 
THE SHADOW OF MAHAN: EARLY CONCEPTIONS OF BATTLECRUISERS 
 
 Fisher‘s Committee on Designs also reimagined the armored cruiser, returning 
with the battlecruiser, a conception radical enough that it soon required a new name. 
According to the Committee:  
The fast armored cruiser renders all other cruisers useless. With this speed of 25 
knots, and with an armament of 12-inch guns, the armored cruiser can overtake and 
annihilate everything that floats except the proposed battleship. . . . However, the 
armored cruiser has another mission to perform. She has to overtake and keep touch 
with a fleeing battle fleet, and possibly bring it to bay by the wounding which her 12-
inch guns are capable of . . . Indeed, these armored cruisers are battleships in 
disguise!
118
 
 
The Committee assumed that other nations would soon build dreadnoughts, so the 
battlecruiser was not originally intended to fight in the heart of major fleet action. 
Although battlecruisers were deemed capable of standing in the line of battle, if 
necessary, they were really designed for filling other roles: the scouting, harrying and 
pursuit functions that could not be undertaken by battleships. While dreadnoughts were 
designed to fight in line, battlecruisers were intended to play a freer, more independent 
role, detached from the line.  
 While the Dreadnought presented American naval thinkers with a new type of 
battleship, battlecruisers were something new altogether, a problematic new classification 
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resting uncomfortably between the recognized classes of armored cruiser and battleship. 
Although the Navy was able to adopt the new battleships, they represented a repudiation 
of Mahan‘s understanding of tactics and gunnery, not his vision of the function and role 
of the Navy. The existence of a large, heavily armed ship whose purpose was something 
other than taking and dealing punishment in the midst of a major battle represented 
something entirely alien to this worldview. How, then, would naval thinkers in the U.S. 
react to this new type of ship?  
  The British construction of the first set of three battlecruisers was undertaken 
under greater secrecy than that of the Dreadnought. Nevertheless, once launched, the 
American worldview that discounted the importance of cruisers led to little discussion of 
the construction and capabilities of the Invincibles. Although the battlecruisers and the 
Dreadnought were authorized under the same bill, only the battleship attracted immediate 
notice within the United States. The December 1905 ―Professional Notes‖ section of 
Proceedings, where foreign navies were discussed, brought up the Dreadnought and her 
design at length, with no mention of the new cruisers.
119
 Although the new cruisers were 
mentioned in the next issue, it was almost as an afterthought. An extract from a British 
journal noted that the new cruisers ―will, we understand, be the most powerful that have 
yet been built,‖ but the Dreadnought still dominated the section on the Royal Navy.120  
 However, the Navy League Journal was far more comfortable discussing new 
ideas, and in August, 1907, it published an article on ―Battle-ship Cruisers.‖ The article 
appears to have been written without the benefit of detailed knowledge concerning the 
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Invincibles, which explains the author‘s conception of battlecruisers as ―an ideal ship for 
preying on a peaceful trade route,‖ since ―all the ordinary convoying cruisers in the world 
could do nothing to check them.‖121 Although the author got the justification for the 
battlecruiser almost exactly backwards, the article had a better understanding of the 
battlecruiser concept than the next few years of Proceedings and pronouncements from 
the General Board would. If nothing else, he imagined the battlecruiser operating in an 
independent role, detached from major fleets, an understanding that the General Board 
could not match.   
 Not until the next year would writers in Proceedings begin to grasp the 
significance of battlecruisers, and when they did, the reaction was uniformly negative. A 
run of articles in Proceedings during 1907 attacked the concept of speed as a desirable 
quality in warships after the specifications of the first battlecruisers became more widely 
known. While the 21 knot speed of dreadnought battleships was not challenged, authors 
in Proceedings took aim at what they saw as excessive speed; in short, battlecruisers.  
 The most interesting of these generally polemical essays was a French article, 
translated by Philip Alger, the editor of Proceedings and a professor at the U.S. Naval 
Academy. The author argued that speed was ―an essentially precarious policy . . . a speed 
remarkable at one time is considered ridiculously small some few years later.‖122 On the 
other hand, the author saw armor as timeless, setting up a distinction between ―the 
permanence of the service which effectively armored ships can render in comparison with 
the short-lived value of fast ships with little or no protection,‖ obviously taking aim at the 
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fast, lightly armored battlecruisers, an interesting contrast to Mahan‘s criticism of a 
―simple belief in bigness.‖123 The article ends with: ―Armor is the best of weapons; on the 
other hand, ‗Vitesse, c‘est faiblesse.‘ (Speed is weakness.).‖124  ―Armor and Speed‖ was 
certainly not a subtle article, and its translation by the editor of Proceedings highlighted 
the stance of the journal. All articles on speed in Proceedings took the same stance 
against, to paraphrase Mahan‘s Tsushima essay, a simple trust in speed.  
 One article in 1908‘s first issue made the point even more explicitly, attacking 
battlecruisers in particular, rather than the concept of speed in general. Harkening back to 
Mahan, the author of ―The Question of Speed in Battleships,‖ Ensign R.R. Riggs, argued 
that Tsushima did not demonstrate the value of speed. He then proceeded to paraphrase 
Alger‘s translated article in claiming that out of the major components of battleship 
design—speed, armor and firepower—speed was ―the most unreliable of these . . . 
elements.‖125 
 More important than his rehash of old debates, though, was his attack on armored 
cruisers and their larger cousins. An armored cruiser, Riggs argued, ―is nothing in the 
world but a battleship in which guns and armor have been sacrificed for three knots‘ 
speed,‖ putting them at a disadvantage when matched against battleships.126 If not 
designed for fighting battleships, Riggs asked, ―what is she intended for? Surely not as a 
scout, . . . for vessels of a fifth the displacement could do this work as well . . . .By 
escaping from a stronger enemy she will never win wars. History teaches that it is only 
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by the shock of armed fleets that this is done. . . . Every argument against [armored 
cruisers] holds good against the battle-cruisers of the Invincible type.‖127 This highlights 
again the American obsession with major battles to the exclusion of other forms of 
warfare. 
 In summing up his argument, Riggs revealed the influence of Mahanian doctrine 
when he argued that wars were ―not to be decided by skirmishing or cross-raiding, but by 
one or more pitched battles. . . . [E]very nerve should be strained both in peace and war to 
prepare for these battles. As armored cruisers have been shown not to be as valuable . . . 
as are battleships, they are a mistake.‖128 This sentiment could have come directly from 
the pen of Mahan in 1905 and demonstrates again that while Mahan was unsuccessful in 
preventing the adoption of dreadnoughts, his ideas remained the bedrock of naval culture 
in the U.S. The assumptions remained, repurposed here in an attack on cruisers. 
 As unfulfilling and unspecific as Proceedings’ Mahanian rearguard action was, it 
demonstrated the way Mahan permeated American naval thought. Both the attacks on 
speed and Riggs‘s anti-battlecruiser article relied on some of the same arguments that 
Mahan made in his discredited Tsushima piece. While Proceedings is just one journal, 
surely it is telling that the main professional journal in the United States either would not, 
or could not find a pro-battlecruiser essay to publish until 1915, a year into the First 
World War.
129
 For better or worse, Riggs‘s article stands up as a précis of Proceedings’ 
policy towards the new ships. Indeed, despite his lowly rank, Riggs neatly summed up 
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the Navy‘s policy on cruisers: after the last Tennessee-class armored cruiser was 
commissioned in 1908, the Navy built no more until the mid-1920s, and of course the 
Navy did not lay down battlecruisers until late 1916.  
 The General Board was also cool towards battlecruisers, perhaps the result of a 
lack of understanding. Instead of seeing battlecruisers as armored cruisers writ large, the 
Board perceived the Invincibles in 1906 as, ―in reality battleships . . . very fast and 
powerful ships designed to form a part of the battle line.‖130 As with Riggs‘s Mahanian 
understanding of the non-value of speed, the General Board‘s report suggests an inability 
to come to grips with battlecruisers in a conceptual sense. Instead of the hybrid role 
envisioned by the British Committee on Designs, the General Board was unable to see a 
role for a 12-inch gun ship except in the line, where its superior speed would be 
irrelevant.  
 In all fairness, if one conceives of battlecruisers as ships intended primarily to 
augment the line of battle, they were nearly useless. With their 1910 ―Report on Building 
Program,‖ the General Board asserted exactly that. After four years of silence on the 
subject of battlecruisers, the Board returned to the subject of battlecruisers in their annual 
report request for ships. The section on battlecruisers started promisingly enough by 
describing their development as an offshoot of armored cruisers: ―Since 1904, by 
increasing enormously the size of the armored cruiser it has been possible to make the 
sacrifice of gun power by reducing the number of main battery guns whilst maintaining 
their size. Reduction in protection has been made.‖131 However, the new ships were 
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judged by their ability to take the place of a battleship: ―[t]he characteristics of this type 
of vessel therefore preclude their effective use as an integral part of the fighting line.‖132 
Overall, the Board concluded, ―we can for the present defer the construction of large 
armored cruisers whose cost and complement equal that of the battleship, and whose 
value in war is to some extent, as yet, problematical.‖133 
 Despite the gap of four years, the General Board still discussed the battlecruiser in 
terms of its role in the line of battle, not independent operations or even as a ―flying 
wing‖ with the main fleet, but out of  the line. Again, judged on these merits, the General 
Board‘s opinion was reasonable and, in light of future events, entirely correct. The 
problem did not lie in the answer, however, but in the question. The battlecruiser was 
explicitly not designed to fit into the battle line, yet that is exactly where the General 
Board thought of it. Even if Fisher himself conceded that battlecruisers could join the line 
in a pinch, efficacy in major battles is only a part of what makes a ship valuable, yet to 
the General Board, it was the sole factor in determining the utility of the battlecruiser.  
 As reaction within the Navy to battlecruisers proves, the shadow of Mahan still 
lay over naval thought. The debate over the Russo-Japanese War and dreadnoughts 
challenged Mahan‘s technological and tactical expertise, but not his basic system of 
thought. Mahanian thought, then, was larger than the man himself. While the namesake 
could not integrate speedier battleships into his worldview, his heirs as naval intellectuals 
could, seeing the extra speed of dreadnoughts as a bonus in combat, as long the 
displacement was large enough to avoid reductions in armor and firepower.  
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 The even greater speed of battlecruisers, however, was not congenial to this 
system. Battlecruisers matched the increased displacement of battleships, but the extra 
weight was given over to propulsion, not protection. Battlecruisers were fast, powerful, 
and markedly superior to any previous cruisers, but their ideal place was not in the line. 
The General Board, already uneasy with armored cruisers, could certainly not conceive of 
a useful strategic niche for battlecruisers.  
 At the Naval War College, amongst the cream of the naval intelligentsia, the 
battlecruiser was discussed on its own terms, but still not yet welcomed. In 1909, one of 
the questions considered concerned ―fast battleships,‖ and whether it was better for such 
ships to have ―a powerful battery with limited protection,‖ or, ―a moderate battery with 
heavy protection.‖134 Echoing Fisher‘s original arguments, the panel charged with 
answering the question concluded that ―the value of ships . . . is largely increased when 
these ships have sufficient speed to place themselves wherever needed in the shortest 
possible time . . . .A fast battleship squadron is a necessary part of a modern fleet.‖135 
However, instead of these fast battleships taking after battlecruisers, the committee 
suggested instead that ―with a given displacement and speed a moderate battery with 
heavy protection is superior.‖136Allowing for speed as the primary goal of such a ship, 
these officers suggested that firepower be sacrificed in the name of protection. Even 
though the report argued against battlecruisers, the committee couched its arguments in 
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the language of capability, rather than type, a key move away from Mahan‘s system of 
thought.  
 Of even more interest is the minority report, written by Cmdr. C.S. Williams. 
Although Williams made it clear that if a fast battleship was needed, ―an increase in the 
displacement seems to be the logical and inevitable solution.‖ Given the choice asked in 
the question, he favored ―the ship with a heavy battery and reduced armor,‖ not least 
because a commander would not feel tempted to plug it into the battle line, where either 
type would be at a severe disadvantage.
137
 Despite his evident unease, Williams went as 
far as suggesting that the United States build a few battlecruisers ―as Great Britain, 
Germany and Japan already have such vessels it would seem good policy for this country 
to build a certain number of [battlecruisers].‖138 
 Although Williams‘s argument was unpopular in 1909, the Navy did eventually 
come around to the idea of battlecruisers, although it was a much more difficult process 
than the adoption of dreadnoughts. As the majority report, and the General Board‘s letters 
demonstrate, American naval culture placed a premium on ships with enough armor to 
survive in the thick of the melee. Unlike dreadnoughts, battlecruisers were incompatible 
with pure Mahanian strategic thought. To shift the Navy‘s leadership in favor of 
battlecruisers would require a subtle, but nonetheless real, culture shift—no easy task. 
While American dreadnoughts were built after a relatively short period of empirical and 
theoretical debate, the long road towards acceptance of battlecruisers would take years, 
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and draw in substantive critiques of Mahanian strategy, theorizing, and the empirical 
evidence from the first year of the First World War. 
  
CONCLUSION 
 
 By 1910, the contentious debate in the United States surrounding dreadnoughts 
had been almost forgotten, and the new ships were considered the backbone of the fleet: 
ten all-big-gun ships were in service or under construction, with more to follow. These 
ships, however, fulfilled the same role as pre-dreadnought battleships in Mahanian 
thought. The Navy at large still saw battleships as the ultimate arbiters of naval warfare 
and discounted the importance of speed in fleet engagements, not to mention the role 
scouting, screening, and other ―lesser‖ tasks played in warfare. Although the debate was 
contentious, once debate ended and dreadnoughts were built, they were easily integrated 
into the prevailing system.  
 Battlecruisers, however, suggested that the opposition to dreadnoughts did not just 
stem from a lack of technical knowledge. The navy‘s strategic culture left it unable to 
fully grasp Fisher‘s innovations. The critiques leveled by the General Board against 
battlecruisers betrayed a conceptual lack of understanding. It is clear from looking at the 
internal British documents, not to mention ships themselves, that battlecruisers were 
intended to take the place of armored cruisers in the fleet, but the General Board was 
unable to see them as anything but a type of battleship. It may be true, as many historians 
have argued, that battlecruisers were a mistake, making the General Board‘s decision to 
reject the type a blessing in disguise. Even if the decision was correct, it was made under 
false pretenses, highlighting the old thinking at the heart of the Navy.  
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With the benefit of hindsight, we can decry this lack of intellectual depth, but 
without keeping strategic culture in mind, we cannot begin to understand it. There are any 
number of immediate reasons that the General Board would consider battlecruisers to be 
a subset of battleships, but without the basic understanding that this mode of thought was 
firmly embedded in the Navy‘s strategic culture, any analysis remains superficial. 
Despite his humiliation at the hands of Sims, Mahan‘s ideas retained a strong pull over 
the Navy and continues to do so, although this pull was especially strong until the First 
World War. The only way to explain the influence of Mahan is by understanding the 
ways in which his ideas formed the basis of the Navy‘s strategic culture. Mahan did not 
color Navy culture as usually understood understood: traditions, patterns of action and so 
on, but instead he affected the way which the Navy understood war.  
Mahan‘s writings created a set of strategic assumptions  that the overwhelming 
majority of  American naval thinkers internalized. Even when arguing against his specific 
ideas, men like Sims and Fiske showed their intellectual debt to Mahan‘s system of 
thought. In turn, these assumptions affected the issues of design and procurement 
discussed above. Without understanding the influence of Mahan on American thought, 
the decisions and debates of the early twentieth century are impossible to properly 
analyze. 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the Navy was in the midst of a 
furious expansion, and most historians deal with the period by analyzing that buildup and 
its expression in the ―Great White Fleet‖ voyage. As this thesis has shown, however, this 
impression of a single-minded focus on building ships ignores the flux at the heart of the 
period. Even if acceptance of battlecruisers had to wait until the next decade, the shift 
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from pre-dreadnoughts to dreadnoughts was far more contentious than the traditional 
literature would allow. It took some acceptance of new thinking to understand the 
importance of the Dreadnought, and that acceptance did not come overnight.  
The experience of the U.S. Navy in this period highlights the importance of 
strategic culture in exploring military institutions. In a purely analytical sense, the 
approach allows us to understand the Navy‘s hesitance to build dreadnoughts, and even 
greater resistance to battlecruisers, both otherwise baffling decisions. More importantly, 
it provides the best framework for studying military institutions in the absence of warfare. 
We cannot know for sure how the Navy would have fared in a war in the early twentieth 
century, but we can understand how the Navy envisioned war, and it paints a somewhat 
sobering picture. The sort of war the Navy was preparing for was a thing of the past, and 
the state of naval thought in the U.S. reflected that. Mahan may have helped drag the 
Navy into the modern era in the 1890s, but by 1910, his ideas were a brake on progress.
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